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When it became obvious in 2014 that the US Air Force was providing indirect 
air support for Shi’i militias and Iranian advisers in Iraq in the fight against the 
group known as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the world was stunned. 
The United States, it seemed, had come to terms with the fact that, given the 
rising jihadist threat, Iran and its protégés in Iraq had become potential partners 
with whom the operational burden could be shared. In reality, the US war against 
ISIS followed an already well-established US doctrinal approach to security in 
the Middle East, according to which, if vital US national interests are not directly 
concerned, the mobilization of partners and allies allows for the sharing of the 
strategic and operational burden of war. In the aftermath of lengthy and costly 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration’s approach to the 
Middle East has not been one of disengagement so much as one of shifting engage-
ment. While US strategic interests in the region have arguably not changed, the 
question is—given the changing geopolitical environment, the US role in it and a 
new American domestic context: what are the means the US is willing to employ 
to continue to influence outcomes in the Middle East? Another, more important, 
question is: what are the consequences of the Obama Doctrine for the standing 
of the United States in the region?
Alongside political and economic levers of power, the military lever of power 
retains a prominent role in the United States’ toolbox. However, the nature of 
military action favoured by Obama’s White House has been shaped by a decade of 
military restructuring, oversized defence budgets and public war fatigue. Unlike 
his predecessor, Obama appears to prefer waging war in the shadows with a light 
footprint and if possible limited public scrutiny. Externalizing the strategic and 
operational burden of war to human and technological surrogates has developed 
into America’s preferred way of war under the Obama administration.
This article sheds light on the nature of US engagement in the Middle East 
under the Obama administration within an altering geostrategic and domestic 
context. Geostrategically, the United States finds itself at the crossroads in its 
transition from a bipolar to a seemingly apolar world, in an age of risk1 where 
military intervention might have to come preventively, for an indefinite period of 
1 See Christopher Coker, War in the age of risk (Cambridge: Polity, 2009).
Andreas Krieg
98
International Affairs 92: 1, 2016
Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
time, anywhere in the world in defence of peripheral security interests—and in 
a complex operational environment where the lines between state and non-state 
actors are blurred. Domestically, the Obama administration’s Middle East policy 
is haunted by the legacy of the Bush era: public war fatigue, austerity measures 
and military downsizing after long and costly military engagements in the region. 
Against this strategic backdrop, this article argues that war by surrogate has 
become a preferred means of protecting US interests in the world, fundamentally 
redefining the US role vis-à-vis partners and adversaries alike. The case-study used 
here to explore the motivations for US surrogate warfare and its potential risks 
is the Middle East—a region torn by conflict where the alleged US policy of 
‘retrenchment’2 has become most visible.
At a time when the Obama administration has been accused by political adversar-
ies at home and international partners alike of having neglected the Middle East,3 
the article sets out to examine surrogate warfare as a US policy choice across an 
area stretching from northern Africa over the Levant to the Gulf. In contrast to 
his harsh critics, this article argues that Obama has been anything but idle when 
dealing with complex strategic security matters. Rather, the foreign and security 
policy tools employed by Washington since 2009 are a product of the changing 
US geostrategic role and its domestic context. Surrogate warfare appears to be the 
compromise Obama has found as a way of dealing with the Bush legacy and a grow-
ing ‘apolarization’ of international affairs, particularly in the Middle East. Surrogate 
warfare offers an alternative means of maintaining US influence in the region.
The article begins by introducing the concept of surrogate warfare within 
both a historical and a contemporary geostrategic context. It then turns to look 
at the Obama Doctrine and its implications for US foreign and security policy 
towards the Middle East, moving on to explain why the Obama administration 
has favoured a policy of externalizing the burden of warfare to surrogates over a 
direct commitment of US ground troops to the Middle Eastern theatre. In conclu-
sion, the article sheds light on the implications of surrogate warfare for US foreign 
and security policy in the region.
The concept of war by surrogate
The concept of surrogate warfare in the literature is poorly defined. It relates 
to the debate about compound and proxy warfare, terms that have been used 
interchangeably. Surrogate warfare, however, is a wider concept that incorporates 
aspects of compound and proxy warfare but extends further in drawing on the 
idea of an RMA (‘revolution in military affairs’). Essentially, surrogate warfare 
2 Daniel W. Drezner‚ ‘Does Obama have a grand strategy? Why we need doctrines in uncertain times’, Foreign 
Affairs 90: 4, 2011, p. 58.
3 See ‘America and the Middle East: a dangerous modesty’, The Economist, 6 June 2015; Josef Joffe, ‘Obama’s 
“Greta Garbo moment”’, The American Interest 9: 5, April 2014; Kenneth M. Pollack’s remarks during the US 
Senate hearing on US Middle East policy in US Senate, Hearing to receive testimony on US Middle East policy 
(Washington DC: Alderson Reporting Co., 24 March 2015); ‘Marco Rubio: Obama’s strategy for the Middle 
East has backfired’, Washington Post, 29 May 2015; Stephen Sestanovich, ‘The price of pulling back from the 
world’, New York Times, 9 Feb. 2014.
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describes a patron’s externalization, partially or wholly, of the strategic, opera-
tional and tactical burden of warfare to a human or technological surrogate with 
the principal intent of minimizing the burden of warfare for its own taxpayers, 
policy-makers and military. The term ‘surrogate’, etymologically deriving from 
the Latin verb surrogare meaning ‘to elect as a substitute’, in this respect refers to a 
human or technological substitute deputizing for the patron’s own ground forces.4 
Thus a surrogate does not necessarily substitute for the entire military capability 
of the patron, as a proxy does, but may do so in respect of only infantry capability, 
in which case the surrogate acts as a simple force multiplier.
War by surrogate can entail aspects of compound warfare, which Huber defines 
as degrees of strategic and operational synergy between regular and irregular forc-
es.5 In compound warfare, two forces complement each other’s efforts by coordi-
nating, on either the strategic or the operational level, the planning and execution 
of military campaigns. Both parties see cooperation and coordination, even if only 
marginal, as mutually beneficial since these serve their strategic or operational 
objectives. Compound warfare moves beyond the concept of proxy warfare as it 
does not require the patron–proxy or activator–proxy relationship that by defini-
tion puts the proxy at the receiving end of a chain of command controlled by the 
patron or activator.6 In compound warfare, the regular and the irregular force 
operate simultaneously, although with varying degrees of direct coordination and 
integration, with neither side necessarily following the orders of the other. Thus, 
in contrast to the patron–proxy relationship, the relations between the regular and 
irregular fighting forces in compound warfare are more egalitarian. Compound 
warfare goes beyond the narrow definition of proxy warfare, which for the most 
part remains a relic of the Cold War, a context within which the patron was defined 
as a state actor merely exploiting the proxy to advance external objectives in an 
international struggle with another external state actor.7
Set against compound and proxy warfare, surrogate warfare is more of an 
umbrella concept. Patron and surrogate can be state or non-state actors. Non-state 
actors can be terrorist organizations, insurgency groups, transnational movements, 
mercenaries or private military and security companies. Cooperation, coordina-
tion or force integration can be direct, indirect or coincidental. The surrogate can 
be a technological platform that enables the patron to wage war by means more 
effective, economical or clandestine than the conventional infantry force. Surro-
gates can employ regular, irregular or hybrid means of warfare, providing the 
patron with a range of core and niche capabilities.
The idea of using surrogates to externalize the strategic and operational burden 
of war is nothing new. Like the concepts of asymmetric, irregular or unconventional 
warfare, war by surrogate has been a constant feature in the history of warfare.8 
4 Oxford English Dictionary, www.oed.com, accessed 18 Oct. 2015.
5 See Thomas M. Huber, ‘Compound warfare: a conceptual framework’, in Thomas M. Huber, ed., Compound 
warfare: that fatal knot (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army CGS College Press, 2002).
6 Yaakov Bar Siman-Tov, ‘The strategy of war by proxy’, Cooperation and Conflict 19:  4, 1984, p. 269.
7 Karl W. Deutsch, ‘External involvement in internal war’, in Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal war (New York: Free 
Press, 1964), p. 102.
8 Andrew Mumford, Proxy warfare (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), p. 1.
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Romans employed ‘barbarian’ tribes to multiply their forces, relying on their local 
knowledge and relations with local populations; the most famous example is that 
of Arminius, the German chieftain who supplied the Romans with tribal support 
in the inaccessible terrains east of the Rhine.9 The wealthy Renaissance city-states 
of northern Italy employed the condottieri—commercial armed contractors—to 
protect their wealth from greedy neighbours.10 In the American Revolution, the 
British Army multiplied its forces by using 35,000 Hessian mercenaries to fight the 
hybrid threat of Washington’s continental army and colonial militias.11 Wellington 
owed his success in the Peninsular War against Napoleon’s Grande Armée to the 
support of the Spanish guerrillas attacking the French occupier’s lines of commu-
nication.12 The relatively small island nation of Britain was able to rule more than 
a quarter of the world only by relying on colonial surrogates: twelve political offic-
ers, 100 British soldiers and 800 paramilitary surrogates could control 10 million 
people.13 In the early stages of the Second World War, when Britain was far from 
ready to engage the Nazi threat directly, Churchill envisaged employing continen-
tal resistance movements as surrogates to attack the Wehrmacht from the rear.14 
During the Cold War, with the growing need for deniability, the superpowers 
often resorted to the use of surrogates to achieve strategic objectives overseas, the 
Soviet support for the Vietcong in Vietnam and the US support for the mujahideen 
in Afghanistan being the most famous examples.
Since the end of the Cold War the use of surrogates has become more widespread, 
with western powers relying on both manned and unmanned air power and on 
commercial military contractors, and so-called ‘rogue states’ supporting terrorist, 
insurgent, rebel or quasi-volunteer groups.15 Three factors have made the employ-
ment of surrogates an even more attractive course of action in this period: the 
increasingly apolar nature of the international system; the shift from a threat-
based to a risk-based perception of security; and fundamental changes in the 
operating environment.
First, surrogate warfare is a trend that has to be understood within the context 
of a paradoxical reshuffling of the global system in which, while the state retains in 
law the full authority to regulate and manage international affairs, its authority is in 
practice challenged by non-state actors operating in the global system. In this new 
apolar system no one actor can dominate an increasingly anarchic environment.16 
Anarchy in this context exceeds the limited realist concept of the international 
9 James Lacey, ‘Conquering Germania: a province too far’, in W. Murray and P. R. Mansoor, eds, Fighting 
complex opponents from the ancient world to the present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
10 P. W. Singer, Corporate warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2003), p. 22.
11 See Rodney Atwood, The Hessians: mercenaries from Hessen-Kassel in the American Revolution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980).
12 Max Boot, Invisible armies: an epic history of guerrilla warfare from ancient times to the present (New York: Norton, 
2013), pp. 82ff.
13 John Ferris, ‘Small wars and great games: the British Empire and hybrid warfare, 1700–1970’, in Williamson 
Murray and Peter Mansoor, eds, Hybrid warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 201.
14 Peter R. Mansoor, ‘Introduction: hybrid warfare in history’, in Murray and Mansoor, eds, Hybrid warfare, p. 4.
15 Ariel I. Ahram, Proxy warriors: the rise and fall of state-sponsored militia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
16 Richard N. Haass, ‘The age of nonpolarity: what will follow US dominance?’, Foreign Affairs 87: 3, May–June 
2008, pp. 44–56.
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system as a leaderless state-centric construct, referring instead to a competitive 
system that is not international but transnational in nature: that is, it is shaped not 
exclusively by the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states, but by a dynamic 
interaction between state and non-state authority across the boundaries of states.
Second, the post-Cold War Zeitgeist, characterized by the impermissibility of 
interstate war17 and growing conventional deterrence, has prompted states to 
consider means of achieving strategic objectives other than major combat opera-
tions18—including alternative military options. The ‘everywhere war’19 of the 
twenty-first century has fundamentally changed the strategic perspective of states 
on security and security provision; in this age of risk, the perception of threats 
is not geographically confined to the direct vicinity of one’s borders. As a conse-
quence, publics in one part of the world see their militaries being deployed in 
another part of the world in pursuit of interests that are perceived as less than 
existential—a reality that prompts political and military leaders to externalize the 
risks of war to communities in the operating theatre. The idea of a ‘riskless war’, 
as Kahn puts it,20 prompts states, according to Shaw, to engage in ‘risk-transfer’ 
wars,21 whereby the burden of warfare is delegated from the military to the 
civilian population. The externalization of the burden of warfare to technological 
surrogates such as manned and unmanned air power is part of this risk transfer. In 
an effort to minimize the operational risk exposure for service personnel, those 
personnel are removed from the battlefield—either partially, as in war waged by 
air strikes alone, or entirely, as in the case of drone warfare.22
Third, surrogate warfare has to be understood within the changing context 
of twenty-first-century operating environments, which are shaped, according to 
Kaldor, by ‘paramilitary units, local warlords, criminal gangs, police forces, merce-
nary groups, and also regular armies including break away units ...  [operating] 
through a mixture of confrontation and cooperation even when on opposing 
sides’.23 The ensuing operational anarchy on the ground necessitates the state’s 
engagement with these unconventionally fighting actors in war. States rely on 
non-state actors as proxy warriors in complex environments to achieve degrees of 
deniability, operational effectiveness and legitimacy in insurgency environments.24 
Non-state surrogates provide states with more capable means of achieving objec-
tives cheaply and sustainably.25 Thereby the state’s support for rebel and insurgency 
groups or terrorist organizations creates the complex operating environment—an 
17 Bruno Tertrais, ‘The demise of Ares: the end of war as we know it?’, Washington Quarterly 35: 3, 2012, p. 10.
18 John Mueller, ‘The obsolescence of major war’, Security Dialogue 21: 3, 1990, p. 321.
19 Derek Gregory, ‘The everywhere war’, Geographical Journal 177: 3, 2011, pp. 238–40.
20 Paul W. Kahn, ‘The paradox of riskless war’, Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 22: 3, 2002, p. 8. 
21 Martin Shaw, The new western way of war (Malden, MA: Polity, 2005).
22 See Michael J. Boyle, ‘The costs and consequences of drone warfare’, International Affairs 89: 1, Jan. 2013, pp. 
1–29; John Kraag and Sarah Kreps, Drone warfare (Malden, MA: Polity, 2014); Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens 
and Matt Flannes, ‘Drone warfare: blowback from the new American way of war’, Middle East Policy 18: 3, 
Fall 2011, pp. 122–32.
23 Mary Kaldor, New and old wars: organized violence in a global era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 
p. 9.
24 Ahram, Proxy warriors, p. 17.
25 Idean Salehyan, ‘The delegation of war to rebel organizations’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 54: 3, 2010, p. 502.
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environment in which states struggle to compete when relying solely on their 
conventional means of force.26
While surrogate warfare, as noted above, is far from a historical anomaly, the 
reasons and motivations behind the employment of surrogates have changed in 
recent decades. A patron’s propensity to use surrogates depends on a variety of 
factors: namely, the need to minimize operational and political costs in face of a 
fading sense of urgency, a lack of adequate capability, and the need for deniability 
and legitimacy.
The urgency of a crisis is the sum of the political leader’s perception of the 
immediacy of a threat to vital national interests and the potential humanitarian 
considerations. The former are linked to the more realist components of foreign 
policy, the latter to its altruistic components. The cost factor comprises the antici-
pated financial, human and political costs of intervention. In risk transfer wars, 
surrogates provide the patron with a means of absorbing operational risk on 
behalf of the patron’s service personnel. Political costs refer here to the costs for 
policy-makers of committing to a crisis in the face of public opinion, which can be 
either positive or negative, in support of intervention or strongly opposed to it. As 
public opinion, at least in western democracies, more often than not appears to be 
opposed to military action,27 costs tend to loom larger than urgency in this factor.
The capability factor sets the availability of the patron’s own human capacity 
to carry out military action against the availability of technological platforms to 
take the place of that capacity. The more capital-intensive the patron’s strategic 
decision-making, the more ready the patron will be to substitute capital for labour, 
namely to pay for human or technological surrogates.
The need for deniability is another factor driving patrons to externalize the 
burden of warfare to surrogates.28 At this time of transnational conflict involving 
a growing number of non-state actors waging war across borders, it has become 
increasingly easy for outside state actors to generate an effect on the ground 
without having to deploy ground troops overtly. Direct or indirect support for 
non-state actors as surrogates can generate desired effects more covertly.29
Finally, surrogates allow patrons to get involved in insurgency struggles, civil 
wars or rebellions without losing legitimacy in the eyes of the local civilian popula-
tion.30 Generating a desired effect indirectly through surrogates who are part of 
the local socio-political fabric enables the patron to achieve strategic or operational 
objectives more effectively in a highly populated warfare environment.
26 See Navan Bapat, ‘The internationalization of terrorist campaigns’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 24: 4, 
2007, pp. 265–80; Daniel Byman, Trends in outside support for insurgent movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); 
Daniel Byman, Deadly connections: states that sponsor terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
27 Hugh Smith, ‘What costs will democracies bear? A review of popular theories of casualty aversion’, Armed 
Forces and Society 31: 4, Summer 2005, pp. 487–512.
28 Shaw, The new western way of war, pp. 55, 88.
29 Geraint Hughes, My enemy’s enemy: proxy warfare in international politics (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 
2012), p. 35.
30 Mansoor, ‘Introduction’, p. 9.
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The Obama Doctrine and surrogate warfare
The alleged shift in US foreign policy under Obama since 2009 has been the 
subject of heated debate. After two terms of expansive US foreign policy under 
Bush, guided by the belief that the United States had to be able to project force 
overseas unilaterally in defence of its own and its allies’ national interests, Obama’s 
approach to foreign and security policy initially appeared non-interventionist, 
the administration’s attention being directed more towards domestic affairs.31 
After the devastating experience of two costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, with 
US taxpayers and service personnel carrying the principal burden, Obama was 
adamant that in a context of austerity and globalization, military action had to 
be, first, limited to the defence of vital US interests and, second, carried out by 
a leaner, more flexible military force acting not unilaterally but multilaterally in 
cooperation with local allies.32 It was not necessarily the objectives of US foreign 
policy that changed, but rather the means chosen to achieve them.33
Recognizing ‘our [US] limits in terms of resources and capacity’,34 Obama’s 
primary strategic approach to foreign and security policy has been driven by the 
maxim of ‘multilateral retrenchment’, a principle ‘designed to curtail the United 
States’ overseas commitments, restore its standing in the world, and shift burdens 
onto global partners’.35 Thus, the Obama administration has primarily been trying to 
maintain its foreign posture by means not solely reliant on military power or pres-
ence. Accentuating the need for ‘soft power’ engagement with allies, partners and 
adversaries,36 however, does not equate to closing off the option of military action 
altogether. On the contrary, some would argue that Obama has shown a considerable 
readiness to use military force37 to protect vital national interests against geographi-
cally and legally amorphous threats,38 often ill defined. However, given the complex-
ity of the operating environment and the domestic constraints in play, the use of 
force employed by the Obama administration has been of a different nature.
The Obama Doctrine is a product of the shifts in the geostrategic environment 
noted above. There is a realization in Washington that the United States, though 
a Great Power, is not omnipotent, as a variety of different actors actively seek to 
undermine the statist foundation of the international system.39 In addition, as the 
perception of security shifts from a basis in threat to a basis in risk,40 and the entire 
31 James M. Lindsay, ‘George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the future of US global leadership’, International Affairs 
87: 4, July 2011, p. 772.
32 Fawaz A. Gerges‚ ‘The Obama approach to the Middle East: the end of America’s moment?’, International 
Affairs 89: 2, March 2013, p. 301.
33 Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Dagget, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F. Martin, Ronald O’Rourke and Bruce 
Vaughn, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama administration’s ‘rebalancing’ toward Asia, Report for Congress (Washing-
ton DC: Congressional Research Service, 28 March 2012), p. 4.
34 Fareed Zakaria, ‘The strategist’, Time, 30 Jan. 2012.
35 Drezner‚ ‘Does Obama have a grand strategy?’, p. 58.
36 Gerges, ‘The Obama approach to the Middle East’, p. 302.
37 Boyle, ‘The costs and consequences of drone warfare’, p. 2.
38 The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington DC, 2010).
39 See Haass, ‘The age of nonpolarity’.
40 See Ulrich Beck, Risk society: towards a new modernity (London: Sage, 1992); Anthony Giddens, Consequences of 
modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1990).
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concept of security is thereby defined less tangibly and more subjectively, the 
Obama administration has found it hard to develop a strategic security narrative. 
Dealing with risks, in an increasingly complex operating environment in which 
states are pitted against evasive enemies with low-tech capabilities, the Obama 
administration—like other governments—is confronted with the challenge of 
preventing or reacting to often ill-defined threats while minimizing the burden 
of warfare at home.
Obama’s Doctrine, questioning the utility of great military power in the 
twenty-first century, is in fact merely an extension of the Rumsfeld Doctrine, 
which coined the idea of a ‘military lite’—a flexible, responsive and agile military 
relying on technology and a limited footprint.41 Apart from new operational 
requirements in contemporary operating environments, the two most impor-
tant factors determining the Obama administration’s approach to military action 
have been austerity and an increasingly war-fatigued American public. The latter 
factor has been shaped by the aftermath of what in hindsight have been defined 
as ‘wars of choice’—the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that involved 2 million 
servicemen and women, left 6,000 Americans dead and 40,000 wounded, and 
cost more than US$1.5 trillion.42 The legacy of these conflicts left the Obama 
administration with few military courses of action to choose from: any military 
action undertaken had to be off the public radar, cost-efficient and a matter of 
last resort in protection of vital US national interests. Former Defense Secre-
tary Leon Panetta laid out the implications of this strategic norm for US force 
structure: ‘As we reduce the overall defence budget, we will protect and in some 
cases increase our investments in special operations forces, new technologies like 
unmanned systems, space and in particular cyberspace capabilities and in the 
capacity to quickly mobilize.’43
The consequent force structure blurs the lines between overt and covert opera-
tions on the one hand and between Pentagon and CIA operations on the other. 
As part of the same narrative, the Obama administration has repeatedly stressed 
the importance of strategic burden-sharing through multilateral approaches to 
local crises. The point is clearly stated in the National Security Strategy 2015: 
‘The threshold for military action is higher when our interests are not directly 
threatened. In such cases, we will seek to mobilize allies and partners to share the 
burden and achieve lasting outcomes.’44
Thus the core principle of the Obama Doctrine is burden-sharing, both strate-
gically and operationally. On the strategic level, it emphasizes the need for collec-
tive action through coalition warfare and for capacity-building of local partners 
and allies.45 On the operational level, it prioritizes covert warfare, relying increas-
41 Nick Turse, The changing face of empire: special ops, drones, spies, proxy fighters, secret bases and cyber warfare (Chicago: 
Haymarket, 2012), p. 2.
42 Richard N. Haass, ‘The irony of American strategy: putting the Middle East in proper perspective’, Foreign 
Affairs 92: 57, June 2013, p. 59.
43 Quoted in Ed Pilkington, ‘Barack Obama sets out plans for leaner military in historic strategy shift’, Guardian, 
5 Jan. 2012.
44 The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington DC, 2015), p. 8.
45 The White House, National Security Strategy (2015), p. 9.
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ingly on technological platforms, special forces operations and CIA operatives to 
achieve strategic and operational objectives out of the public eye.46 Essentially, 
Obama’s foreign policy is one that lays the doctrinal foundation for surrogate 
warfare: externalizing the burdens of warfare to human and technological surro-
gates. The post-Iraq US policy towards the Middle East appears to be testimony 
to the doctrinal shift to waging war by surrogate in the absence of vital national 
interests.
Responding to insecurity in the Middle East
Since President Obama came into office, US relations with the Middle East have 
been conducted in the context of the administration’s alleged ‘pivot towards Asia’. 
From the outset the administration highlighted the importance of Asia for US 
national interests in all dimensions. However, that is not to say that a US focus 
on Asia was ever intended to come at the expense of the US commitment to the 
Middle East. In fact, Obama’s overall grand strategy was not about fundamentally 
redefining the core objectives of US foreign and security policy but rather about 
reconsidering how to achieve them.47 Nonetheless, the rhetorical accentuation 
of Asia unsettled many US allies in the Middle East, who feared that after the 
disengagement from Iraq and Afghanistan the region would be left to its own 
devices.48 In the event, instead of disengaging from the Middle East, the US has 
changed the nature of its engagement—as it has across the spectrum of conflict 
in the world at large.49
It was the Arab Spring that challenged Obama’s strategic approach to the 
Middle East, suddenly propelling the region back to the top of the US foreign 
policy agenda. As Haass wrote in 2013: ‘Now that most Americans want little to 
do with the greater Middle East, US officials are finding it difficult to turn away.’50 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that although key regional partners were 
affected by the socio-political upheavals in the region, vital US national interests 
were never at stake before the rise of ISIS in 2014.51 And even since then, the 
definition of the ISIS threat appears vague from a US point of view, as both the 
jihadists’ actions and their narratives focus primarily on changing the socio-polit-
ical authority structure in the region. Consequently, the Obama administration 
has been wary of getting sucked into the quagmire of leading major combat opera-
tions against an organization that is considered to pose a threat mainly to local 
communities and populations. Thus, while western media have arguably created 
a threat hype about ISIS,52 most analysts and experts, including those in uniform, 
46 Boyle, ‘The costs and consequences of drone warfare’, p. 3.
47 Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific?, p. 4.
48 Haass, ‘The irony of American strategy’, p. 64.
49 Richard N. Haass and Martin Indyk, ‘Beyond Iraq: a new US strategy for the Middle East’, Foreign Affairs 88: 
1, 2009, p. 41.
50 Haass, ‘The irony of American strategy’, p. 59.
51 Gerges, ‘The Obama approach to the Middle East’, p. 309.
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have expressed scepticism about the ISIS threat to US homeland security, aside 
from the lone wolf phenomenon.53
Thus, with the US security narrative remaining ill defined within the apolar 
geostrategic environment of the early twenty-first century, US leadership in the 
Middle East and beyond becomes difficult to measure on the basis of its actions. 
While rhetorically Middle East stability remains a US priority, US ‘leadership 
from behind’ meant that surrogates were empowered to secure strategic and 
operational objectives in the region that are—at least from an American point of 
view—peripheral. The externalization of the burden of warfare has thereby been 
justified by the maxim of letting local partners solve local problems. As Obama 
has repeatedly stated in one way or another: ‘Ultimately, it’s not the job of ...  the 
United States to solve every problem in the Middle East. The people in the Middle 
East are going to have to solve some of these problems themselves.’54
The US delegation of authority or burden to partners in the region has taken 
different shapes and forms, ranging from indirect tacit through indirect explicit 
to direct support of various state and non-state surrogates. It is worth empha-
sizing again that the employment of external parties as surrogates for US foreign 
and security policy is nothing new, dating back as far as the 1950s when the US 
government used the Central Intelligence Agency to arm, equip and train a force 
to carry out a coup d’état in Guatemala.55 Even so, warfare by surrogate has never 
before been the principal means of securing US interests overseas, as it has been 
under the Obama administration.
The most indirect form in which the burden of warfare has been delegated to 
surrogates has been the employment of Iran as a proxy in the war against ISIS in 
Iraq. While US officials have been adamant that there is no force integration on 
the operational level,56 Iranian operatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards 
Corps under General Soleimani have provided the necessary ground complement 
to US-led air strikes against ISIS positions in Iraq in 2014 and 2015.57
A more direct form of surrogate warfare has been the US military assistance 
delivered to Arab allies in the Middle East, most notably Egypt, Jordan and the 
Gulf states.58 While the US policy of training, equipping and advising militaries in 
the Middle Eastern context is decades old, the Obama administration is the first to 
have relied directly on Arab military capability to contain regional threats. During 
the NATO-led Libya campaign, the United States provided key capabilities to its 
allies in the air. At the same time it granted the Qatari and UAE armed forces its 
53 See Massimo Calabresi, ‘Understanding the ISIS threat to Americans at home’, Time, 9 Sept. 2014; Conor 
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ISIS, greatest threat to US, general says’, Defence One, 14 July 2015.
54 ‘President Obama continues his news conference on the Iran deal’, CNN transcripts, 15 July 2015.
55 Loch K. Johnson, ‘Intelligence analysis and planning for paramilitary operations’, Journal for National Security 
Law and Policy 5: 2, 2012, p. 492.
56 Department of Defense, ‘Joint press briefing by Secretary Hagel and Japanese Minister of Defense Itsunori 
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57 Kasria Naji, ‘Iran’s Revolutionary Guards take lead on foreign affairs’, BBC News, 29 Jan. 2015.
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tacit approval to train and equip Libyan rebel forces on the ground to operate in 
conjunction with coalition air power.59 The same is true in Syria: Gulf states have 
been involved in training and equipping Syrian rebel forces in their fight against 
the Assad regime since 2012.60 Here, the Gulf states acted as Washington’s surro-
gate in liaising with the opposition. In the case of Yemen, it was regional allies 
that carried out Operation Decisive Storm in April 2015, bringing their military 
capability to bear, with the United States merely providing logistical and intel-
ligence support.61
The United States has also directly employed non-state actors as surrogates on 
the ground. In Syria it has trained and equipped units of the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) and moderate rebel brigades such as the Harakat al-Hazm.62 In northern 
Iraq, US special forces have provided training and support to Kurdish peshmerga 
fighters to act as surrogates on the ground against ISIS militants.63
Technology is another major surrogate for the United States in the Middle 
Eastern theatre. In an effort to avoid putting boots on the ground, the Obama 
administration has relied heavily on manned and unmanned air power. In opera-
tions in Libya, Syria and Iraq, the US military has externalized operational risks to 
conventional air power platforms that can eliminate targets with impunity from 
high altitude. The Obama administration has also massively extended the armed 
drone programme, with significant effects on US kinetic engagement in the Middle 
East. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) have become a central feature 
of US covert operations, providing air cover for special forces on the ground 
and, more often than not, operating as a stand-alone platform as part of the US 
counterterrorism strategy.64 UCAVs have been deployed in the fight against ISIS 
in Iraq and Syria,65 against the Gaddafi regime in Libya,66 against Al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula in Yemen,67 and against Al-Shabaab militias in Somalia.68
Motivations for Obama’s surrogate warfare
The motivation for resort to surrogate warfare by the Obama administration 
includes all the elements identified above: deniability, legitimacy, urgency, costs 
and capability.
The most important factor in US decision-making is arguably the relationship 
between urgency and costs. The multiple crises in the Middle East are perceived 
59 Ian Black, ‘Qatar admits sending hundreds of troops to support Libya rebels’, Guardian, 26 Oct. 2011.
60 Amena Bakr, ‘Qatar runs covert desert training camp for Syrian rebels’, Reuters, 26 Nov. 2014. 
61 David D. Kirkpatrick, ‘Egypt says it may send troops to Yemen to fight Houthis’, New York Times, 26 March 
2015.
62 Nancy A. Youssef, ‘Syrian rebels describe US-backed training in Qatar’, PBS Frontline, 26 May 2014.
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Islamic State’, Wall Street Journal, 21 Sept. 2014. 
64 Kraag and Kreps, Drone warfare, p. 19.
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as not urgent enough in terms of vital US national interests and humanitarian 
considerations to merit intervention on that basis alone. While the Obama admin-
istration has rhetorically condemned the humanitarian crises in Syria, Iraq and 
Yemen, these events have not mobilized sufficient public pressure at home to 
justify the deployment of US ground troops. At the same time, the anticipated 
financial and human costs of a joint force intervention in Syria, Iraq and Yemen 
are considerable.69 Taking into account the US public’s hostility to major combat 
operations in the Middle Eastern theatre,70 any direct military intervention in 
these theatres would generate substantial political costs for the administration at 
home. The key aspect in this respect is perceived public opposition to the use of 
ground troops, not just because of the financial costs their deployment entails for 
any US administration but, more importantly, because of the potential political 
costs arising from the return of dead bodies. It is important to recognize here that 
US public opinion might shift in favour of sending ground troops into the Middle 
East in response to changes in threat perceptions.71 Sensitivity to casualties remains 
essentially an elite perception of the public response rather than a real reflection of 
public opinion.72 The cost–benefit analysis of the urgency of a crisis as weighed 
against the anticipated costs of intervention is conducted in policy-making circles 
and not necessarily in the heads of constituents. It follows that the decision to 
minimize operational risk for US service personnel cannot be blamed on the US 
public.
Capability is another factor in the Obama administration’s considerations. The 
reduction of human capacity and the concomitant investment in technology, 
coupled with a high propensity to substitute capital for labour, make the United 
States more inclined to externalize operational burdens of war to technological 
platforms.73 Defence budgets in recent years have reflected a shift away from the 
human domain to the technological, with investment in technology procurement 
and research and development rising as troop levels fall.74
Deniability has also played an important role in the US administration’s decision 
to employ surrogates. In particular with regard to training opposition forces in 
Libya and Syria, surrogates in the Gulf, most notably Qatar, have functioned as 
facilitators, providing arms, money and training to rebel forces. In Libya, Qatar 
was willing to do this in potential breach of UN Security Council Resolution 
1973—with the tacit approval of the United States, which did not want to be seen 
69 Haass, ‘The irony of American strategy’, p. 66.
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doing the same itself.75 In Syria, the Obama administration was concerned that any 
direct, open support for Syrian opposition groups would generate public opposi-
tion at home. As a 2013 Pew study indicates, Americans have been highly sceptical 
about a possible direct US military intervention in the Syrian civil war.76 Thus, 
while the US use of Qatar as a surrogate for the pursuit of American foreign and 
security policy objectives in both crises was not a covert action, it did allow the 
Obama administration to publicly deny any direct US involvement in the conflict. 
Even the US training missions for Syrian rebel forces in Qatar remained largely 
out of the public eye, attracting only marginal media attention—something a 
direct military intervention with boots on the ground would have been unable 
to achieve.
Finally, there is the aspect of legitimacy and the idea that local forces are better 
able to achieve objectives in a highly complex environment where they are more 
effectively integrated into the local social fabric. US or western ground troops 
will always be seen as foreign invaders in the Middle East, even if their objectives 
are humanitarian in nature.77 Consequently, surrogates can achieve objectives on 
behalf of the United States as an external patron without the potentially inflam-
matory effect of introducing US ground troops.
Thus surrogate warfare appears to provide the Obama administration with a 
tool that enables it to pursue operational or strategic objectives in low-interest 
conflicts overseas without having to bear the human, financial and political costs 
of war.
The consequences of surrogate warfare for US policy in the Middle East
Externalizing the burden of warfare to surrogates has had a range of strategic 
and operational consequences, some of which could potentially undermine the 
utility for the United States of this alternative means of engaging in warfare in the 
Middle East. Contrary to Mumford’s assertion that surrogate warfare is a low-risk 
alternative to the direct intervention of the patron,78 a state with the ambition of 
being a superpower may face the risks of losing control and oversight, escalating 
crises, undermining its own long-term interests and, most importantly, jeopar-
dizing its strategic and moral reputation.
First, the reliance on surrogates involves the delegation of authority and action 
to substitutes, who have the discretion to use the delegated authority as they see 
fit. Patrons have very few means available to them to exercise direct control or 
oversight over the surrogate. Regardless of the degree of cooperation between 
patron and surrogate on the strategic or operational level, surrogates are ultimately 
autonomous actors who always have an agenda of their own to pursue79—an 
75 Sam Dagher, ‘Tiny kingdom’s huge role in Libya draws concern’, Wall Street Journal, 17 Oct. 2011.
76 Richard Drake, ‘US aid to Syrian rebels: public has opposed American involvement in the past’, Pew Research 
Center, 14 June 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/14/u-s-aid-to-syrian-rebels-public-
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77 Stephen M. Walt, ‘Do no (more) harm’, Foreign Policy, 7 Aug. 2014. 
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agenda which may overlap only marginally with US foreign policy. Some US 
surrogates of recent years, such as the Gulf states, can be seen to have pursued 
their own agendas, either only partially supporting US policy or at times even 
contradicting it. While there may have been agreement on the overall strategic 
objectives in Libya, Syria or Yemen, Gulf partners might disagree with the United 
States about the means of achieving them.80 The same is true for non-state actors. 
Rebel and opposition forces in Syria or Iraq are not serving the US agenda but 
pursuing their own domestic goals, which might ultimately undermine US long-
term interests. The historical precedents of US support for the Saddam regime in 
Iraq and the mujahideen in Afghanistan provide ample reason for caution in this 
respect.
Second, surrogate warfare often does not allow for direct operational integra-
tion and coordination. As a consequence, operations are not conducted with a 
high degree of synergy.81 This is particularly true for operations between patron 
air power and surrogate ground forces. In the case of Iraq, where Shi’i militias 
supported by Iranian advisers serve as indirect force multipliers for US air power, 
operational effectiveness is undermined by the lack of force integration and direct 
communication. In Libya, too, the initial lack of synergy between coalition air 
operations and surrogate ground operations posed a major obstacle to a swift 
victory.82
Third, surrogates bear the risk of prolonging the conflict by either escalating 
the situation or merely tipping the balance of power in the wrong direction.83 
Money, commodities and arms provided by the patron, particularly to non-state 
surrogates, might be diverted into the hands of individual strongmen, tribal, rebel 
or ideological leaders attempting to strengthen their personal standing vis-à-vis 
partners and competitors. Widespread corruption fuels war economies, where the 
primary interests of key local actors might not be a swift solution of the conflict 
but power and control over resources. For example, US lethal and non-lethal aid 
to the Syrian National Council and FSA has been diverted to build institutional 
patrimonies rather than translated into operational effectiveness on the ground.84 
Much of the US military aid provided to Egypt or Yemen has been used by 
regimes to bolster authoritarian control by paying off key protégés in the military, 
with little actually spent on enhancing capability.85 Hence, by escalating existing 
conflicts or indirectly fuelling underlying causes of conflict, support for surro-
gates can bring the risk of the United States having to get involved militarily itself 
to stop a conflict that an unsuccessful policy of surrogate warfare has exacerbated. 
The US policy of backing the regime in Baghdad in its fight against ISIS and Sunni 
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insurgency meant that Iranian-backed militias have de facto become indirect tacit 
surrogates of Obama’s Iraq policy. Not only have these surrogates exacerbated the 
conflict on the ground, they have caused the US to gradually augment its troop 
presence in Iraq—thereby causing the patron to get sucked back into the war.86
Fourth, the employment of technological surrogates has undermined US 
strategy. In particular, the drone programme, which has been expanded under 
the Obama administration, has had adverse results in theatre. The targeted killing 
of suspected insurgents and terrorists from the air, jeopardizing the lives of civil-
ians with limited host state supervision, has created widespread public antagonism 
towards the United States in fragile insurgency environments.87 The consequent 
loss of hearts and minds not only increases the social base of insurgents and terror-
ists but, worse, weakens the local authority structure in already failing states.88 In 
Yemen and Pakistan in particular, US overreliance on UCAVs has worked against 
the overall US counterterrorist and counter-insurgency strategy respectively.
Finally, surrogate warfare in the Middle East has had a less than positive impact 
on the strategic reputation and moral standing of the United States in the world.89 
On the strategic side, the US under Obama has lost its ability to deter or coerce 
players in the region—thereby undermining its claim to global superpower 
status.90 Partners and potential adversaries alike have lost faith in its ability and 
willingness to do what is necessary to directly protect and secure its interests in 
the region. Most notably, partners in the Arabian Gulf and Israel, who have tradi-
tionally looked to the United States as an external protector, fear that Obama’s 
policy rationale of delegation through the empowerment of surrogates will leave 
them having to cater for their own security independently.91 This lack of trust in 
the reliability of US protection has triggered arms races in the Gulf and a surge 
of right-wing, paranoid, security-focused policies in Israel. Surrogate warfare has 
also detracted from the United States’ moral standing. Both human and techno-
logical surrogates have generated effects that are questionable under the laws of 
armed conflict or in some instances may even constitute war crimes. US manned 
and unmanned air power has occasionally killed civilians indiscriminately, while 
Shi’i militias and Libyan and Syrian rebels have been involved in gross human 
rights abuses.92
Overall, then, surrogate warfare has come at an immense cost for the United 
States’ standing in the world in general and the region in particular. While it 
has enabled the US to exercise limited regional influence at low cost politically, 
financially and in terms of lives, it has fatally damaged its claim to be a superpower 
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able and willing to use all means necessary to shape the outcome of events on a 
global scale. As a democracy held accountable by its own liberal legacy and as the 
world’s largest economy, the United States might be rendered more vulnerable 
by the resort to surrogate warfare as the principal means of protecting its interests 
than other great, regional or small powers. The loss of control and oversight, 
the inability to shape conflicts directly and the failure to develop sustainable 
and reliable long-term strategies for US national interests have undermined the 
position of the United States as the leading power in an increasingly apolar world.
Conclusion
The externalization of the burden of war to surrogates as substitutes for a power’s 
own ground troops is a constant in the history of warfare, dating back to ancient 
times. What have changed are the reasons and motivations for the use of surro-
gates. It is no longer just the need for deniability or the lack of capacity that 
prompts the resort to surrogates. Especially in the case of western powers, surro-
gate warfare today is a response to a perceived misfit between the urgency and the 
costs of military intervention.
In the United States, surrogate warfare has its roots in the proxy wars of the 
Cold War, the post-Iraq rethink about US strategy and military capability, and 
the increasing possibilities provided by the RMA. In an apolar globalized world, 
where local conflicts have global implications just as global conflicts have local 
implications, the United States remains the most powerful player, economically, 
politically and militarily. However, in relative terms US power is diminishing as 
austerity requires budgets to be tighter, the American people call for commit-
ments closer to home, and operational environments become more complex. All 
these factors have prompted the United States to explore new means of achieving 
strategic or operational objectives in conflicts overseas while minimizing the 
burden for American taxpayers, policy-makers and the military.
The effects of Obama’s policy rationale of ‘leading from behind’—or, more 
accurately, leading out of the public eye, has been particularly visible in the 
Middle East, where the upheavals of the Arab Spring have further destabilized an 
already conflict-ridden region. State and non-state actors have become direct or 
indirect US surrogates of war, providing security locally with limited direct US 
involvement. Decades of military aid, equipment and training have been put to 
the test as regional partners have been asked to live up to the role for which they 
have been groomed for decades: maintaining regional peace and security. Rebel 
movements and militias have been trained to act as surrogates providing the neces-
sary capability on the ground to complement US air power. High-tech platforms 
have provided the punch where human surrogates were either absent or deemed 
unreliable.
As a result, the role of the United States in the Middle East has been defined by 
absence—an absence particularly marked after two decades of direct engagement 
beginning with the First Gulf War. Regional partners have begun to question US 
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superpower status, now that it seems unable to act as a global hegemon to influ-
ence outcomes in the region. While the United States remains a Great Power, 
including in the Middle East, it has reached the end of its hegemonic control. 
America has shifted from being a guarantor of security or a protector to being a 
partner, assisting local surrogates to take over responsibility to provide security in 
their own backyard. As long as these surrogates are able to contain threats locally 
with no or little direct effect on vital US national interests, the United States 
might accept less than optimal outcomes in return for the benefit of not having to 
bear the burden of military operations that in Washington are perceived as other 
people’s wars.93
Further research is needed to determine how surrogate warfare is most likely to 
shape the United States’ credibility as the world’s only superpower, particularly 
in other parts of the globe. In an increasingly post-Westphalian world character-
ized by state and non-state apolarity, the notion that one hegemon can monopo-
lize global power seems archaic. Yet in Asia the United States is trying to retain 
its superpower status against adversaries such as China, which themselves have 
explored new means of furthering their interests without resorting to major 
combat operations. It remains to be seen how the United States will try to secure 
its position in such regions, where state power is not in such stark decline as in the 
Middle East. The alternative to surrogate warfare, if any, might be surrogate diplo-
macy, with the United States relying on allies such as Japan to engage diplomati-
cally with China on Washington’s behalf. A grand strategy of delegation, which 
allows the continued exercise of influence, even if not with the same decisiveness 
as local partners would like to see, might not be exclusive to the United States, 
let alone to the Obama administration. Similarly, given the geopolitical context, 
surrogate warfare might be not just the US long-term response to apolarity, state 
failure and the rise of non-state actors but that of the state more generally. Inves-
tigation of the potential consequences of such developments for the structure of 
state authority lies beyond the scope of this article.
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